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Abstract 
This paper introduces the Corruption Emergence Model (CE Model), an artificial society-based 
simulation model of the corruption emergence. The model considers the attitude change as a 
generative mechanism. The attitude changes are described and simulated with a set of self-
organizing processes which feed on each other in a cross-recurrent setup. The simulation model 
investigates the connection between the dynamics of the processes describing the social trust, the 
cognitive dissonance of the agents, their honesty, fairness and responsibility degrees and the 
emergence of corruption in the artificial society.  
 
Keywords: artificial society, corruption emergence, attitude change, self-organizing processes 
 
1. Introduction 
Our approach is focused on a fundamental issue concerning corruption: its sources and 
favouring conditions. How does corruption actually emerge in society ? What are the essential 
social and political mechanisms that generate and maintain corruption? 
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The present approach is mainly concerned with the sources and the favouring conditions 
which allow for corruption emergence and its dynamical evolution. The paper presents an artificial 
society as the experimental framework meant to reproduce the real conditions in which corruption 
emerges in real human societies.  
The general aim of the paper is to identify the social, psycho-social and political 
mechanisms which allow for the corruption processes to emerge and to further evolve in society. 
The theoretical and experimental background of this approach includes several models of artificial 
societies (Axelrod, 1995; Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Situngkir, 2003a,b). 
The present approach identifies several questions which address the issue of research 
briefly described above. In order to find an answer to these questions, it introduces a set of 
hypotheses:  
The first question that arises when we talk about corruption is: “What is it corruption?” – 
The classical answer so far is that corruption is a “behaviour”, more precisely, a “rational 
behaviour” which does not abide by the social normative system of the society (Weber, 1969). 
Other answering alternatives are that, besides rationality and economical necessity, this behaviour 
should include cultural, anthropological, or political attributes.  
The first hypothesis is concerned with the various definitions of corruption: we introduce 
the hypothesis that corruption is better defined as an institution and not as a behaviour or a 
behaviour’s attribute (the “corruption as institution” hypothesis). This would explain why corruption 
evolves to a considerable level of social concern as it does now in the Eastern European post-
communist countries, for example. The issue is not new and the institutional approach is 
mentioned by several authors: North develops a theory of institutional change (North, 1990), 
Teorell introduces a set of analytical arguments concerning the institutional nature of corruption, 
being inspired in his own approach by the characteristics of the corruption phenomena and their 
high intensity in the Eastern European countries which undergo transition processes to democratic 
regimes (Teorell, 2007). Mungiu-Pippidi argues on the institutional nature of corruption in 
advancing the hypothesis of competing social normative systems (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). While 
both Mungiu-Pippidi’s and Teorell’s approach are of a conceptual modeling type, ours is more an 
experimental setup aimed at providing practical demonstration of the above-mentioned conceptual 
models.   
The second hypothesis is that corruption is better explained by attitude change 
mechanisms rather than by the classical rational, goal-oriented choice mechanisms as they are 
defined in the rational choice theory and in the game theory (the “self-organizing nature” 
hypothesis). This hypothesis allows for a complexity approach on corruption, aimed at explaning 
why and how is its dynamics dependent on the initial conditions, why is it path-dependent and what 
are the corruption emergence mechanisms in a sociey. The idea of corruption’s dependence on the 
initial conditions is typical for those approaches on corruption which involve dynamical models 
(Rinaldi et al., 1998; Bardhan, 2001). These approaches, both analytical and experimental, are 
concerned with the dynamics of corruption and its characteristics. 
The third hypothesis, the “possible-world” hypothesis, is concerned with the potential 
outcomes of the social normative systems competition. The idea is that, on the long run, social 
normative systems evolve and compete in a society, making thus possible the emergence of 
institutions. This would explain corruption not as a behaviour or as a deviance from a traditional 
normative system, but rather as an institution which emerges as multiple social normative systems 
compete with each other. This idea is suggested by the studies of corruption in long-term social 
  
 
 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities  EQPAM  
Vol.2, No.1, January 2013 
                      ISSN 2285 – 4916 
                      ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
 
Page 29 
 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
changes like the transition processes from one political regime to another, a phenomenon which is 
characteristic to several post-communist countries in the Eastern Europe. This type of scenario 
would make corruption not a criminal behaviour, as it is considered now, but a “possible world”, 
which can evolve from the current social normative system compettition under certain initial or 
favouring conditions and on certain dynamically evolving trajectories. In her work, Mungiu-Pippidi 
stresses the parsonians idea of “ethical universalism” and its impact on the relationship between 
the concepts of “governance mode” and “corruption” as it has been developed by Weber with 
reference to the concept of “classic patrimonialism” or by O’Donnell (O’Donnell, 1996) with 
reference to the concept of “post-modern particularism” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). This kind of 
approach, though keeps corruption in the behavioural framework, succeeds to change the research 
paradigm confined by the rational choice theory and game theory towards a research paradigm of 
structuralism and complexity. The idea of competing social normative systems and, therefore, of 
evolving institutions appears in this framework as an open alternative in comparison to the closed-
world assumptions of the analytical approaches based on the game theory. In this particular 
context, corruption exceeds its classical status of illegal behaviour and becomes an issue of 
institutional complexity. 
Each of these three hypotheses are used in a complexity-based experimental setting, 
described in the separate sections and subsections of the present paper. Starting from these 
hypotheses, the paper aims at analyzing the social and political scenarios of coorruption 
emergence and also at suggesting further research and theoretical developments. 
The paper is structured as follows:  
Section 1 and Section 2 briefly present a history of the definitions and modeling 
approaches on corruption. It provides the historical perspective over the research on corruption 
from the late 70’s to the present days and provide the criteria used for classifying the corruption 
models. Both the individualistic and the structuralistic approaches are briefly presented and 
analysed. This perspective is meant to provide the specific arguments this approach is based on in 
studying corruption, namely: (1) the limitations of the classical corruption models which involve 
game theoretical analysis; (2) the need for enlarging the theoretical framework by introducing the 
dynamical models and the models based on artificial life techniques: agent-based simulation 
systems and artificial societies. The rationales of the present approach are presented and 
explained.  
Section 3 presents the conceptual work on corruption developed mainly with concern to 
the Eastern European countries involved in transition processes towards democratic regimes. 
Several such researches on corruption reinforce one of the classical approaches on corruption: the 
institutional approach. They often provide the means to investigate the sources of corruption 
outside the very restrictive framework of game theory. Also, some of their authors have constantly 
promoted a mechanism-based explanation of the social processes (Headström, 2005; Headström 
and Svedberg, 1998) which, for corrrruption studies in particular, proves extremely useful.   
Section 4 introduces the conceptual framework of the Corruption Emergence Model, which 
represents the theoretical and experimental contribution of this paper. The theoretical assumptions 
of the paper allow for the approach of corruption emergence mechanism as a set of several self-
organizing processes enacting social structures and perceptions. These self-organizing processes 
are modeled as dynamical processes of (i) trust, (ii) honesty, (iii) fairness, (iv) cognitive dissonance 
and (v) responsibility. The agents are assumed to be able to learn norms, to adapt to normative 
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changes and to distinguish among several types of normative patterns of access rights to public 
(shared) resources and institutions. 
Section 5 describes the artificial society-based model of corruption emergence. An artificial 
society is described as a framework of agents and relationships essentially based on the 
“sugarscape” idea (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). In this paper the artificial society is called 
“briberyscape”. In the briberyscape basic scenario, the agents are classified into several classes: 
bureaucrats, politicians, magistrats and ordinary citizens. Some of the agents are trying to offer 
bribe in exchange of privilleges or in exchange of access rights to public resources. Some agents 
accept bribe and become corrupt agents. Such agents are oftenly connected in networks of 
corruption. The whole artificial society mimics the well-known situations of corruption emergence 
which are described by a rich literature of special reports elaborated by several international 
organizations and institutions during the years after 1989 especially in the Eastern European post-
communist countries. 
Section 6 introduces the experimental setting and the experimental results. The 
experimental setting is a NetLogo based framework of intelligent autonomously moving agents and 
a fix artificial environment which contains public resources. In this virtual environment, the agents 
communicate with each other and develop networks of corruption. 
Section 7 introduces the case studies and the experimental results. There are three main 
case studies: (i) a case study of petty corruption, namely the Briberyscape, (ii) a case study of 
great corruption, in which a “privillege market” is described and analysed, namely Privillegescape, 
and (iii) a case study of corruption networks emergence, namely Baronscape. Each case study 
starts from the assumption that the attitude and attitude change of individual agents can be 
modelled by means of a set of self-organizing processes which model some basic social behavior 
characteristics: honesty, fairness, responsibility, trust and cognitive dissonance. These processes 
are used to describe how the attitude change emerges such that individual agents become corrupt 
agents. The typical scenario is inspired by sociological and psycho-social researches in the 
Eastern European post-communist countries, with a special focus on Romania, which has 
experienced the most destructive communist regime. Such researches report that the citizens in 
such countries inherited from the communist regime a low trust in the state, a minimal set of 
survival values and the culture of privillege in the social and political life. In this context, corruption 
emergence may be modelled as an attitude change. The attitude which characterizes the corrupt 
agents is operationalized as a resignation from the moral values of honesty, social fairness and 
responsibility and a submission to the newly appeared normative system of corruption. The attitude 
change is operationalized by evaluating the cognitive dissonance and the social trust of the 
individual agent: while the cognitive dissonance increases, the individual agent experiences a 
lower trust in state and government. This ever decresing trust in the state impairs the  agent’s 
relationship with the society. As a consequnce, the agent’s value system is reduced to a minimal 
set of survival values. As the cognitive dissonance increases, the agent experiences a higher 
pressure to make an attitude change (Festinger, 1957). In such a society, while struggling to 
survive, an individual agent would easily accept corruption as a new normative system. The idea of 
this attitude change has inspired an artificial society-based model called the Corruption Emergence 
Model.  
Section 8 describes the main conclusions which are drawn from this experimental work. 
The experimental results provide support to the ideas that: (i) the sources for corruption are better 
described by an institutional-based approach, than by a behavioral one; (ii) the corrupt society is 
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better modelled as an artificial society than a theoretical game, and (iii) the artificial society-based 
simulation of corruption provides a better description of the society as a whole in terms of the 
macro-micro link than a game theoretical simulation. 
 
2. Brief History of Corruption Studies 
2.1. Early Researches on Corruption  
During the past decade, the issue of corruption has became a subject for agent-based 
modelling and simulation due to the difficulties faced by the classic analytic approaches in 
assessing the complexity of this phenomena and in measuring its characteristics using the 
statistical and game theoretical analysis only. The complexity of this issue lies not only in its 
definition, but also in its measurement and evaluation.  
During the early 70’s, the weberian concept of bureaucracy and of its rational-legal 
character has been applied to the broad analysis of the corruption phenomena. First analyses on 
corruption in the weberian paradigm of the separation between public and private sectors as a 
guarantee for non-corrupt political and administrative democratic institutions2 have been elaborated 
by Krueger (Krueger, 1974) and Susan Rose-Ackermann (Rose-Ackermann, 1975). Susan Rose-
Ackerman became famous starting with the 70’s and mainly during the 90’s for her studies of 
corruption on four main dimensions: (a) the relationship between state and society, (b) the cultural 
factor impact on the nature and expression of corruption in different countries and in different social 
paradigms, (c) the impact factor of the relationship between public and private sector onto the 
growth or decay of corruption phenomena, and (d) the conditions to achieve reform in the presence 
of corruption and in spite of its increasing/decreasing aspects. The aim of her several high-level 
researches is to find a set of characteristics of the individual corrupted behavior and also a relevant 
set of its incentives and deterrents in order to recommend anti-corruption prevention and currative 
measures. Klitgaard identifies a formula which is now famous and also studied the complex 
conections between corruption and culture (Klitgaard, 1988). 
In the following years, the sharp peak of occurences and the wide spread of corruption 
phenomena experienced by many countries, especially after 1989 by the former communist 
Eastern European countries in their transition processes to democratic regimes, determined an 
increased attention and a special focus on this research issue. Country and cross-country case 
studies offered the means for acquiring a deeper understanding of the sources and causes of 
corruption. These case studies have determined a shift in the research interest on corruption from 
the classic individualistic paradigm towards the structuralist one and, recently, towards the 
institutional emergence paradigm. Though several authors have approached the issue of 
corruption modelling on different theoretical and experimental backgrounds – game theory, agency 
theory, dynamic systems, agent-based systems or artifical society – no one has suceeded so far in 
identifying and providing a full picture of the sources which generate and maintain the various and 
complex corruption phenomena. 
 
2.2. Definit ions and Theoretical Paradigms  
                                                          
2 Médard  J.-F. 1995. “La corruption politique et administrative et les différenciations du public et du privé : une 
perspective comparative”, in M. Borgi et P. Meyer-Bisch(eds.), La corruption ou l'envers des droits de l'homme, 
Editions universitaires, Fribourg, Suisse, pp.37-46. 
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Corruption has been defined in different ways, depending on both the goal of research and 
of its theoretical and empirical background. Some of these definitions have succeeded to get the 
wide acceptance of the scholars from social, economical, and political sciences. These definitions 
should be however explicitly associated with the research paradigm underlying the different 
approaches. The undeniable fact that corruption research is nowadays very much differentiated 
itself is a clear consequence of the variation these definitions allow for in both conceptual and in 
the empirical and experimental working paradigms. 
There are two main areas of theoretical descriptive definition which are concerned with 
corruption phenomena: (i) the research focused on the individual corrupt behaviour and (ii) the 
research focused on the social and political processes which actually produce, involve or just favor 
the emergence of corruption phenomena (Jain, 2001). Each of these domains is characterized by a 
particular research paradigm, by specific types of models and by associated types of 
measurements and/or empirical or experimental methodologies of result validation. 
We will briefly present the approaches, the paradigms and the impact each of them had or 
is actually exerting onto the historical development of the corruption research as a whole. We will 
therefore identify schools of thought, schools of modeling and trends in the area of experimental 
simulations of the corruption phenomena. 
 
2.2.1. Definition and research on the issue and types of of corrupt behaviour  
A major motivation for the interest in this issue of research was that of understanding, 
promoting and improving the good-governance in democratic societies. Therefore, we can identify 
definitions of corruption as an individual behaviour which goes against democratic rules and whose 
economical and political consequences are particularly harmfull for the good-governance in a 
democratic system. Under these assumptions concerning the democratic society, such a definition 
for corruption entails the development of appropriate description of its economical effects and of 
the anti-corruption means. The definition which has been widely accepted is that which considers 
individual corrupt behaviour as the use of public office and/or public resources for personal interest 
and gain (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Ackerman, 1996; 1997; 1998). The research approaches 
developed on the basis of this definition aim at describing corruption as a process characterized 
by: (i) a set of qualitative attributes which can be conceptually defined and explained using rational 
concepts and terminology like “rational agent”, “rational behaviour”, “maximizing utility”, “risk 
aversion”, “payoff”, “gain”, etc.; the classical type of approaches are fundamentally based on the 
game theoretical analysis; (ii) a set of quantitative attributes which can be observed and measured 
in empirical studies using either experience-based or perception-based methods of measurement 
(Jain, 2001; Johnston, 1996). There are, however, some other types of measurement, for instance, 
those based on public opinion and on social attitude measurement, which are very interesting, but 
which oftenly lack, according to some authors, accuracy and objectivity (see Jain, 2001). A widely 
used perspective over corruption is the economical perspective, which mainly involves the rational 
agency theory and game theoretical analysis. Oftenly, it is directly connected or it is directly 
addressing a legal perspective, mainly involving the concept of “criminal behaviour” (Rose-
Ackerman, 2010) and dichotomies like “legal/illegal”, “legitimate/illegitimate”, which are discussed 
and analysed with respect to the concept of “law enforcement” as one of the pivotal concepts in the 
theories concerning the issue of the anticorruption fight.  
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The classical approaches are concerned with two level of granularity in dealing with the 
actors of corruption phenomena. One is the macro level or, put in other words, the level of the 
fundamental institutions in a democracy, like the Government, the Parliament, etc. The other is the 
micro level or the individual level. Approaches on the macro level are mainly concerned with the 
state and society, the government and the social-economical system as a whole. This kind of 
approaches investigate the good-governance in democratic societies and the impact of corruption 
on the macro structures of its fundamental institutions. This type of corruption is usually called 
“grand corruption” (Jain, 2001), because the main actors in such scenarios are the politicians 
and/or the magistrats. The main themes are concerned with the legislative, political and 
administrative corruption. The legislative corruption is concerned with law enforcement, while the 
political corruption is mainly concerned with the vote behaviour (Rose-Ackerman, 1998; 1999)3. 
The main research themes in this area of research have been the relationship between 
(i)corruption and the size of the wage (Rijckeghem and  Weder, 1997; Gupta, Davoodi and Rosa, 
1998), (ii)between corruption, economical growth and the level and type of investments (Mauro, 
1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1998; Barreto, 2000), (iii) the productive vs. rent-seeking behaviour 
(Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock, 1980; Pasour, 1983; Tullock G. 1980), (iv) the relationship 
between corruption and governance (Klitgaard, 1998; Rose-Ackerman,1999: Ch.8), (v) the impact 
of corruption on economical growth (Mauro, 1995; Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Gupta et al., 1998), 
(vi) public vs. private sector corruption (Thompson, 2000), (vii) corruption and political power 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1989), (viii) the structure of the governmental institutions and the way it favors 
corruption, thus inducing distortions in the functioning of the governmental institutions themselves 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
Approaches on the micro-level are concerned with the individual actor’s  actions, decision 
makings and goals. This kind of approaches investigate the behaviour of individual agents and the 
efffect of their actions with respect to other individuals. This type of corruption is usually called 
“petty corruption”, because the main actors are the bureaucrats and the individual citizens. 
Both macro- and micro-level research approaches are generally based on the investigation 
of the corrupt behaviour and the ways in which it can be sanctioned and/or corrected, ultimately 
eliminated, by specific law enforcements and economic regulations.  
 
2.2.2. Scales of investigation on the causes and sources of corruption  
One of the criteria used for classifying the type of definitions and approaches on corruption 
is the scale of investigations. Usually, research approaches on corruption are concerned with either 
the macro-level or with the micro-level of theoretical description and very often the macro-micro link 
provide the researchers with the opportunity to understand the causes of the phenomena under 
investigation. Approaches on the macro-level are mainly concerned with the state and/or society as 
a whole. Approaches on the micro-level are concerned with the individual actor and the actions, 
decision makings and goals this actor might have. The research approaches which investigate 
corruption at the level of macro-micro relationship are usually oriented towards the investigation of 
the sources, causes or favouring conditions which allow for corruption phenomena to occur. The 
                                                          
3 See Jain (Jain, 2001), and Tanzi (Tanzi, 1998) for an extended and comprehensive description and interpretation of 
these approaches. 
  
 
 
 
 
Page 34 
 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
Petar Atanasov, “Multiculturalism As A Model: Between Idea And Reality” 
EQPAM Vol.1 No.1 September 2012  
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN-L 2285 - 4916  
Camelia Florela Voinea, “Briberyscape:An Artificial Soci y-Based Simulation Model of Corruption’s Emerg nce nd Growth” 
EQPAM Vol.2 No.1 January 2013  
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN-L 2285 - 4916  
scale of research approach and also the philosophy behind the interpretation of the findings at 
each level and of their inter-relationship with respect to the causes and sources of corruption may 
provide for different kinds of classification, namely into individualistic and structuralistic types of 
approaches. The individualist type, has been mostly preferred by the experts in economical 
science and political economy, and, in general, by the researchers interested in behaviour-oriented 
research. The structuralist type, is usually preferred by the sociologists and experts in political 
science due to its micro-macro social perspective. 
 
 
3. Modelling Approaches on Corruption 
The history of corruption researches includes several modeling approaches. The main 
trend in the area of corruption modeling is that of considering corruption as a socio-economical 
phenomenon, deeply involving both economical and political aspects. The economical perspective 
has provided support for the advance of game theoretical analysis of the corruption phenomena, 
among which bribery is the most investigated. Early and classic approaches on corruption are 
mainly elaborated with a background in (i)game theoretical models, and (ii) dynamical models. 
Early models of corruption describe it as a game (Cadot, 1987; Becker & Stigler, 1974). 
The game theoretical models start from the assumption that the society is represented as a system 
of rational agents, whose behaviours try to maximize the utility of their individual actions with 
respect to a particular goal. The dynamical evolution of the interdependence relationship in such a 
system could be described as a stochastic process able to reach single or multiple equilibrium 
states. 
Other authors introduced dynamical models of corruption (Rinaldi et al., ) which are mainly 
dynamical descriptions of decision-making scenarios based on economic concepts and theory. 
There have been developed two main classical analytical models: the principal-agent 
model and the resource-allocation model. Both types of models are providing an economical and 
rational perspective over corruption issues. Rose-Ackerman builds-up two kind of models: (i) a top-
down model, concerning “grand” corruption and good-governace, and (ii) a bottom-up model, 
concerning the causes of “petty” corruption in the every-day life of citizens. The latter approach is 
mainly inspired by extensive studies on corruption in the Eastern European countries with a post-
communist regime. Gambetta elaborates one of the most interesting game theoretical model based 
on trust (Gambetta, 2000, 2001). Gambetta introduced an analytical model of corruption as a game 
with three players: T (truster), F (fiduciary) and C (corrupter) in which the corruption standard case 
is an exchange in which each agent has incentives/deterrents to act. His model and, in general, the 
issue of trust4 have been the incentives for relevant developments of corruption research in the 
area of social order and social cohesion.  
Lately, the research on corruption has been approached in agent-based models 
(Hammond, 2000) and in artificial society-based models (Chakrabarti, 2001; Situngkir, 2003). In his 
approach, Hammond achieves a stable equilibria description of an agent system which has to deal 
with internal corruption in a closed-form solution. Hammond’s idealistic description of the agents 
focuses exclusively on the endogeneous factors in rejecting corruption.  
                                                          
4 The issue of social trust and its connection to social order, soccial cohesion, and, lately, to corruption are approached 
by several authors. See: Ernest Gellner (2000), Fukuyama, (1995), and Hardin (2001). 
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Bottom-up simulation models of corruption have been inspired by the early 90s’ research 
works in the area of political analysis by means of artificial society simulation models, namely the 
tribute model (Axelrod, 1995), and the sugar scape model, (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). Chakrabarti 
develops an agent-based model of corruption inspired by the Epstein and Axtell’s model. This 
model is used to study the dynamics of a multi-generational population of agents with adaptive 
expectations (Chakrabarti, 2001, pp.6-7). Latest agent-based and artificial society-based 
approaches on corruption like those of Situngkir (Situngkir 2003a, 2003b) are designed for the 
study of the influence of both endogeneous and exogeneous factors in facing corruption. The 
money scape model is inspired by the seminal work of Epstein and Axtell on bottom-up 
approaches of social processes (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). In spite of this important characteristic, 
Situngkir’s approach keeps close to the classical view of corruption as a rational choice scenario in 
which the corrupt agents has and manages economical attributes, operational principles and 
resources in the artificial society.  
One of the most important contributions of Situngkir’s approaches is that he introduces the 
recurrent descriptions of the corruption processes, developing a family of self-organizing processes 
underlying the evolution of a corruption phenomenon like bribery. Moreover, Situngkir makes 
evident that the experimental study of corruption lacks both a theoretical and an experimental view 
of the mechanisms which can and should be used in order to describe the causes or the conditions 
of corruption emergence. The social mechanism problem is not new in the area of social processes 
description: it has been approached from different perspectives and on different backgrounds5. The 
literature of this domain covers both the conceptual and analytical issues (Hedström and Svedberg, 
1998; Tilly, 1995, 2001, 2002). Situngkir’s “money scape” is, nevertheless, the first artificial society-
based simulation model which makes explicit the need to clarify the issue of mechanism as a 
conceptual and technical requirement in the description, simulation and prediction of corruption 
phenomena. 
  
 
4. Corruption and the Eastern European Post-Communist Regimes   
The structuralist approaches on corruption are characterized by the focus on the social 
micro-macro link. The definition of corruption change considerably under this assumptions: 
different authors (Teorell, 2007; Karklins, 2005; Precupeţu, 2008; Rousseau, 2008; Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2010) introduce and support the idea that the view on corruption should involve a global structural 
view on the society itself. Such a view on the society would be able to provide advanced 
perspectives over the sources of corruption. 
Teorell advances the idea that corruption should be approached rather as an institution 
and not as an illegal behaviour (Teorell, 2007). He argues that an institutional approach would 
allow the corruption models and analyses to include a certain aspect which in the classical 
principal-agent models and in the game theoretical analysis is not considered at the degree of 
relevance it really deserves. This aspect concerns the horizontal dimension of corruption. 
According to this view, corruption studies could be extended to the phenomena of social conflict 
rooted in the “inequalities and injustice”, “disparities and polarization”, “frustration” and ”decrease of 
                                                          
5
 See Mayntz (Mayntz, 2003) for a complete overview of the issue from both theoretical and application perspectives. 
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trust” in the state (Precupeţu, 2008)  which characterizes the societies which undergo long-term 
transition processes from one political regime to another. It is the case of the post-communist 
societies in the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe which are currently undergoing transition 
processes to democratic regimes. For such societies, corruption induces a distribution of the social 
conflicts within the social structure itself (Precupeţu, 2007; Karklins, 2002). In such societies, 
corruption is not only an illegal individual behaviour, it is an ubiquous phenomena, accepted or 
tollerated by the citizens either from fear or from frustration (Miller et al., 2001). Its existence, 
persistance and pervasivness prove essential weaknesses of the state and society.  
The approaches based on economical models of interaction between the state and society 
are mainly focused on the principal-agent models. Klitgaard (1988) characterizes the corruption as 
being a phenomenon directly generated by the relationship between individual and society: if this 
relationship presumes higher degrees of responsibility of the individual to a limited group or to 
his/her familiy than the degrees of responsibility to social duties and bondings, then this type of 
relationship evolves to a lack of trust of the individual in society. Klitgaard focuses on the relation 
public-private in the day-to-day life of citizens: he emphasizes that corruption is fundamentally 
associated with a change in the relevance and priority of private ties as compared with the public 
ties: “personal loyalties are held to be more important than formal rules and public duties” (IRIS 
Report, p.50). 
 The issue of trust is studied by Precupeţu in relation to the moral values of the society and 
with the social cohesion: in her research on corruption phenomena in Romania, she shows that a 
main characteristic of the societies penetrated by corruption is the decrese of the trust of their 
citizens in the social values, in the state protection and in the individual chances in such societies: 
“trust in the moral ways of social success decreases and frustration at individual level increases” 
(Precupeţu, 2008). This and several other arguments in the Precupeţu’s research introduce the 
main idea about corruption in the post-communist countries, namely that corruption produces an 
“impaired relationship between individual and the state”: 
 
“Socialisation during communist times is considered as a major cause of today’s corruption by experts from 
NGOs, media and economy groups. In those times, people have learned to develop life strategies within their 
private sphere of life and, with few exceptions, in conflict with the outside world which was not worthy of trust. 
Moreover, a specific rupture between citizens and the state contributed to an impaired relationship that 
people developed with their society. Morality was not assimilated in relation with the state but rather 
conveyed to the groups like family and friends within which people developed strong bonding relations.” 
(Precupeţu, 2008, p.29) 
 
From the perspective of the Romanian justice system (Danileţ, 2009), what really makes 
corruption emerge in a society is in one way or another linked to poor education, lack of information 
and access to information, low ethics and, especially, the lack of control and accountability: 
 
“[…] lack of judicial democracy, non-involvement of civil society in monitoring the system, poor professional 
competence, excessive bureaucracy and disorganisation, fear of retaliation, flawed accountability 
mechanisms, regulations that allow for discretionary decisions” (Danileţ, 2009, p.42). 
 
Danileţ provides a global anaysis of the causes of corruption in the justice system and 
among the high magistrats (Danileţ, 2009): among these causes, he also stresses the idea of 
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public tollerance of corrupt acts (i.e., bribery) as an implicit norm which emerges in post-communist 
societies: 
 
“In many areas, people regard the payment of additional amounts of money in exchange for services as 
“normal”. Usually, patients find it normal to pay extra money to their doctors; similarly, court users are more 
interested in how they may win the favour of the judicial body than in a fair presentation of their case. […] 
The distrust is deepened by the idea—fuelled by mass media reports—that magistrates are subject to 
political influence; […] The ethics in the judicial system reflects the ethics of the Romanian society, which is 
rather low. This is because there is no ethics assessment upon the recruitment of applicants, and, throughout 
their career, assessments are rather perfunctory and sometimes a means of pressure in the hands of 
decision-makers.” (Danileţ, 2009, pp.47-48). 
 
Similar ideas are introduced in the works of Ramsa Karklins (Karklins 2002, 2005), which 
are mainly concerned with the public opinion, political attitude formation and corruption. His 
experience in the analysis of the corruption phenomena in post-communist societies is of high 
relevance: many of his ideas are in agreement with the survey findings and scholar studies of 
corruption in several post-communist societies. His emphasis on the attitude, political culture and 
evolving institutions is deriving from a neo-institutionalist view on the corruption phenomena. 
Karklins stresses the importance of studying the day-to-day attitude patterns of common people 
towards corruption in societies with a strong communist legacy: the attitudes of these people is 
typically characterized by their low expectations, by their decreasing trust in social values, by their 
preference to survival values in spite of moral values of the society (Karklins, 2005, p.58). 
Corruption is thus viewed as a change in the attitude and mentality of people which allows for the 
emergence of new social normative rules, the emergence of new political structures and culture. 
Corruption is but one of these emerging phenomena:  
 
“[…] the post-communist region shows certain attitudinal patterns […] the formerly communist-ruled societies 
stand out with an overemphasis on survival values, at the expense of self-expression values, including those 
linked to the community. As shown below, arguments about the necessities of daily life and survival are also 
prominent in public discourse […] But political attitudes are not static; they shift over time, especially when 
major changes occur in regimes, policies, or social conditions. […] the analytical conclusion is that political 
culture is dynamic and can change, for better or worse. That is so if one accepts a definition of political 
culture that links a people’s political cognition, emotions, evaluations, and values to concrete political 
structures, experiences, and opportunities. This is also in accord with the theoretical assumptions of neo-
institutionalism underlying this study, […] institutions can shape new attitudes and behaviors. People’s 
attitudes toward corruption can change, and with this the overall level of corruption in specific societies can 
change. Yet, besides constituting a scholarly argument, this proposition refers to a crucial public attitude, and 
one has to ask how many people in specific post-communist states believe that such change is possible.” 
(Karklins, 2005, p.60) 
 
The neo-institutionalist theories have penetrated the research on corruption and today 
different authors stress the need to approach corruption not only from the governance perspective 
or the legal behavior perspective, but mainly from the perspective of attitude change in a social 
framework as a side-effect of the appearance of new norms, culture and institutions. These ideas 
are implicitly associated with the emergent and competing social normative regimes introduced by 
Mungiu-Pippidi (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). The conceptual assessment of corruption in her approach 
provide the theoretical means for the analysis of institutional emergence in the context of 
transitional processes some societies undergo in social changes from one political regime to 
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another: The example which is again particularly relevant is the case of post-communist regimes in 
the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, namely Romania.  
 
“We know that in societies undergoing transition there are competing normative regimes which strive to 
become dominant. Democratic transition can therefore de described also as an effort to reach a governance 
mode based on ethical universalism. The battle that post communist countries wage is not the legal one 
against individual corruption from developed Europe, where the norm of government impartiality and integrity 
is already set, but a struggle to enshrine such norms and unseat the norm of particularism” (Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2010, p.4). 
 
Mungiu-Pippidi’s definition is particularly relevant to our approach since it sheds light on 
the emergent, competing normative systems. This view assumes a global perspective (namely, the 
generation of a social normative system) over the process of corruption emergence. It also 
assumes corruption as an institution which actually characterizes the post-communist societies 
which undergo transition processes to democratic regimes.The institutional perspective over 
corruption emergence resides in the emergence of the social normative system itself. They are tied 
together in a fundamental relationship: corruption might emerge in societies where such social 
normative systems are competing amongst themselves such that one of them only could finally 
become dominant. In such a framework, corruption is not a battle against defectuous behavior 
under strict norms and legislations which characterizes good-overnance, but an institution like any 
other which could become dominant if the proper context is favorable.  
As these aspects connect to each other, activate and support each other and work 
convergently, the type of the relationship between the state and society in the countries of the post-
communist Eastern European region prove to be almost completely changed in comparison with 
the relationship between state and society in the Western European countries with a traditional 
democratic regime. The difference is not only at the structural and social values level, but first and 
foremost at the level of the collective attitude and social mentality. As mentality is the most 
resistant to change characteristic of social behaviour, it becomes obvious that the influence of 
corruption should be considerable since it succeeded to induce change in mentality itself. This 
phenomena is identified in the several country and cross-country studies elaborated by 
international and European institutions and organizations, like IRIS-USAID (”An Anticorruption 
Reader: Supplemental Sources On Transparency, Accountability, Prevention, Enforcement & 
Education”, 2005), World Bank Reports (“Bosnia and Herzegovina: Diagnostic Surveys of 
Corruption”- 2000; “Corruption in Poland” - 1999, “Corruption in Slovakia” - 2001),  ICG 
(“Macedonia’s Public Secret How Corruption Drags the Country Down”, 2002), UNDP (“Fighting 
Corruption in Post-Communist States - Lessons from Practice", 2002), Transparency International 
(2007, 2008), European Commission (Attitudes of Europeans towards Corruption”, Special 
Eurobarometer, 2009). 
 
 
5. The Corruption Emergence Model 
The Corruption Emergence Model (called in this paper the CE Model) starts from the 
assumption that the corruption processes are dynamical, recurrent processes, feeding on each 
other in cycles which entail the approach on the complexity of their relationship. 
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5.1. The Conceptual Framework  
Our modeling approach on corruption is based on the concept of “impaired relationship 
between the state and society” as described by Precupeţu in (Precupeţu, 2008). This concept 
belongs to a class of concepts derived from the study of the corruption emergence in post-
communist societies of Eastern Europe. This class of concepts includes: (a) the concept of 
institution emergence as defined by North (North, 1990), (b) the concept of survival-based values 
of an agent in a post-communist society as defined by Klitgaard (Klitgaard, 1988), (c) the concept 
of connectivity of corrupt agents in networks of corruption (Precupeţu, 2008; Danileţ, 2009), (d) the 
concept of corruption as emergent from political attitude and mentality change, and from political 
culture as defined by Karklins (Karklins, 2005), (e) the concept of corruption as institution as 
defined by Teorell (Teorell, 2007), (f) the concept of competing social normative systems as 
defined by Mungiu-Pippidi (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). 
In this paper we introduce an emergent model of corruption based on political attitude 
change. In order to described corruption emergence in this paradigm, we develop a simulation 
model of an artificial society in which agents undergo transformations of their political attitude 
induced by changes in their conceptual social framework. This social framework is defined by the 
concepts of trust, cognitive dissonance, responsability, honesty and fairness. 
Trust, Responsibility, Honesty and Fairness are considered attitude structural components.  
The concept of trust has been approached and modelled by different authors. Gellner 
approaches trust in the context of social cohesion and social order research from the perspective 
of the philosophy of governance (Gellner, 2000). Barbalet defines trust from different perspectives, 
going from rationality to emotion, and from social order to social capital, from social theory to 
political theory (Barbalet, 2005). The best known approach on trust modeling is that of Gambetta 
(Gambetta, 2000). It is an analytical model based on the concepts of cooperation and rationality 
which approaches trust as a structural aspect of corruption. In this model, the T (truster), the F 
(fiduciary) and the C (Corrupter) agents are meant to describe in game theoretical terms the way in 
which trust changes in the economy of a corrupt behaviour. Several computational modeling 
approaches on trust are in the area of Social Simulation. They are elaborated on different 
backgrounds: cooperation strategies, reputation, beliefs and emotions, psychology of friendship. 
Agent-based models approach trust either as the output of cooperation and decision-making 
strategies or as the output of psychological and emotion-based multiagent social systems or social 
networks. In these models, trust is an emergent feature of a relationship between social agents 
either as a side-effect of decision-making strategies or as a direct effect of the psychology of the 
social relationships (see (Sutcliffe and Wang, 2012) for an excellent presentation of researches on 
trust modeling approaches in the area of Social Simulation).  
In this paper, we understand trust as social order, in the sense defined by Gambetta 
(Gambetta, 2000). There is an reversed proportionality relationship between cognitive dissonance 
values and the values of honesty, fairness, responsibility and trust. The cognitive dissonance 
varies as the set of recurrent processes of honesty, fairness, responsibility and trust vary 
themselves within certain limits. 
The conceptual framework of the CE Model is based on the following concepts: 
Responsibility, Fairness and Honesty are described with reference to the agent’s relationships with 
(1) the other agents, (2) with the (public or private) resources and (3) with herself. The variations of 
these relationships are produced by each agent’s decision making. By responsability we 
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understand the capacity of an individual agent to make decisions in which the social values are 
compared with survival values. By honesty we understand the capacity of an individual agent to 
make decisions in which the private resources are compared with the public resources. By fairness 
we understand the capacity of an individual agent to make decisions in which social ties are 
compared with personal ties. By trust we understand the capacity of an individual agent to make 
decisions in which society as a whole is compared with the agent herself. 
The CE Simulation Model is based on a complex set of relations and processes which 
model the concepts of attitude, attitude change, honesty, fairness, responsibility, trust and cognitive 
dissonance. The recurrent responsibility process models the relationship evolving between an 
agent and the public resources, the recurrent fairness process models the relationship evolving 
between one agent and its individual ties (related agents), the recurrent process of honesty models 
the relationship between the agent and its own values, and the recurrent process of trust models 
the relationship between an individual agent and the society as a whole. The recurrent process of 
cognitive dissonance models the relationship between the current attitudinal state and the 
variations of the state described by the complex set of processes of trust, responsibility, fairness 
and honesty. The cognitive dissonance varies as the set of recurrent processes of honesty, 
fairness, responsibility and trust vary themselves within certain limits. There is an reversed 
proportionality relationship between cognitive dissonance values and the values of honesty, 
fairness, responsibility and trust.  
The emergence of a political attitude change is defined as a side-effect of a variation in the 
complex relationship between the five recurrent processes. The CE Model simulates the 
transformation of an agent from a “honest” type to a “corrupted” type. This transformation process 
actually describes the emergence of corruption as an attitude change. The agent’ stable attitude is 
a state in which processes of trust, responsibility, fairness and honesty evolve over a certain 
threshold and the cognitive dissonance is very low (under a certain threshold). As soon as one or 
more of the processes of honesty, fairness, responsibility and trust have variations which exceed a 
certain range of values, the stability of attitude is lost: the decreasing outcome of these processes 
allow for an increase of the cognitive dissonance. As soon as the cognitive dissonance exceed a 
certain threshold, an attitude change occurs. The attitude change describes the change from a 
“honest” type to a “corrupted” type of agent. 
Our approach models corruption as an emergent feature of the self-organizing processes 
of honesty, fairness, responsibility, trust and cognitive dissonance. The model starts from an 
arbitrary stable attitudinal state. The decrease of private resources and the increasing responsibility 
for personal ties generate a variation in the processes of fairness, trust and cognitive dissonance 
such that an attitude change emerges. The emergence of attitude change is described as 
“corruption” if honesty, fairness and trust have low values, while responsibility and cognitive 
dissonance have higher values. 
 
5.2. The Model 
Our apprroach is a bottom-up approach on corruption. It is concerned with the emergence 
of corruption in an artificial society.  
Corruption emergence is described as a micro-macro relationship. At the micro level, we 
describe and simulate the self-organizing processes of honesty, fairness, responsibility, trust and 
cognitive dissonance. At the macro level we describe and simulate the corruption emergence.  
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Our view on corruption description and simulation is elaborated from a twofold perspective: 
it combines, on the one hand, the self-organizing complexity of recurrent processes feeding on 
each other, with norm and behavioral learning, on the other hand. The conceptual framework 
accounts for the way in which agents encounter corrupt practices and other (eventually, corrupt) 
agents. As the agents witness a rise of the frequency of corruption phenomena (namely, bribery), 
they might comply with a normative system of the corrupt agents, and, ultimately, they might 
become corrupt themselves. 
The artificial society is the emergent feature of a system of artificial collective agents 
placed in a virtual environment or space which will be called from now on the “landscape”. The 
landscape represents the interaction space of the agents. In this space, the agents might 
encounter corrupt practices, they might experience requests for bribe from other agents as they will 
try to access public (common) resources which have associated, hidden access privilleges 
imposed by the corrupt agents. The landscape will be therefore called: (1) “bribery-scape” for petty 
corruption case studies, (2) “privillege-scape” for grand corruption case studies, and (3) ”barron-
scape” for administrative and bureaucratic corruption case studies.  
The landscape has a random configuration of common resources, representing the public 
resources of the society. Chakrabarti in (Chakrabarti, 2001) assumes that, at the aggregate level, a 
society output results from two kinds of inputs: he  distinguishes the individual type of input and the 
social type. Similar to (Chakrabarti, 2001), we will asume in our approach that the total resources in 
the artificial society are of social type (i.e.: this including both financial and institutional setup of the 
artificial society), and of individual type (i.e.: this including private resources from money to 
personal competence). Since this issue is actually increasing the degree of complexity of the 
artificial society’s description, we will assume that a resource, be it private or publlic, can be either 
accessed or consumed. In the case studies we will extend this subject and make special 
considerations in this respect. 
The agents and the resources are initially randomly distributed in the landscape. While the 
agents are mobile, the resources are fixed in the landscape. As the agents move and interact with 
each other, they either access and/or consume both their private resources and the common 
resources, thus modifying in a fundamental way the structural characteristics of the artificial society 
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996). 
 
5.3. Corruption Emergence 
In our approach, the corruption model starts from the assumption that: the agents undergo 
internal processes of adaptation to a varying normative context. The values of their individual 
attributes are updated iteratively by a set of self-organizing processes: 
The self-organizing processes of social order at the individual level: 
Trust: the recurrent process of trust receives a stimulus from the cognitive dissonance 
process such that the degree of cognitive dissonance operates as a excitation of the trust process: 
 
 oldoldoldnew trcdtrtr  1     (1) 
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where: the current value of trust, newtr , is updated by the cumulative value of two factors: 
the old value of trust and the product of the degree of the cognitive dissonance and the degree of 
trust decrease. 
Cognitive dissonance: it expresses the pressure for attitude change as the relationship 
between what the agent’s expectation and the real situation shows an increase of the difference 
between expectation and reality (Rajecki, 1988); the cognitive dissonance process receive an 
excitation input from the responsibility process: 
 
)1( oldoldoldnew cdrcdcd     (2) 
 
where: the cognitive dissonance new value,
 new
cd , is recursively updated by the 
cumulative value of two factors: the old value of the cognitive dissonance and the product of the 
degree of responsibility and the degree of cognitive dissonance increase. 
Responsibility: the process that supports the social order; it expresses the individual 
agent’s capacity of decision making. We consider that lower degrees of responsibility indicate an 
increase in the agent’s preference for the survival values and an orientation towards the 
preservation of kin ties in spite of the social ones:  
 
)1( oldoldoldnew rfrr       (3) 
 
where: the responsibility new value, newr , is recursively updated by the cumulative value of 
two factors: the old value of responsibility and the product of the degree of fairness and the 
decrease of responsibility. 
Fairness: is a dynamic attribute which expresses the degree of normative correctitude in 
the interaction with other agents concerning the access to common resources.  
 
)1( oldoldoldnew fhff       (4) 
 
where: the fairness new value, newf , is recursively updated by the cumulative value of two 
factors: the old value of fairness and the product of the degree of honesty and the decrease of 
fairness. 
Honesty: is an individual attribute which expresses the degree of honesty as a reference to 
moral values; it is considered to be the behaviour counterpart of fairness. Agents with low honesty 
values are likely to become corrupt. The degree of honesty is recursively influenced by the 
dynamics of trust. 
 
)1( oldoldoldnew htrhh                   (5) 
 
where: the fairness new value, newh , is recursively updated by the cumulative value of two 
factors: the old value of honesty and the product of the degree of trust and the decrease of 
honesty. Honesty receives a special approach in our experiments: we consider that honesty level 
undergoes variations as the agent faces the necessity to access common resources in order to 
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survive. This makes of the honesty value a relevant initial condition and it also makes of the 
honesty evolving process a signal for the self-organizing processes of fairness, responsibility, 
cognitive-dissonance and trust in social values.  
At each iteration, the processes activate and feed on each other in a cross-referential 
relationship. The global connectivity of these processes depends on the initial values of honesty 
and trust. It is a path-dependent global process as we will show in the analysis of the experimental 
results. An attitude-change is considered to depend on the simultaneuous levels of honesty, 
fairness, responsibility, cognitive-dissonance and social trust: if their dynamics reaches 
simultaneously low level of honesty (h<0.3), fairness (f<0.1), responsibility (r<0.5), cognitive 
dissonance (cs>0.75) and social trust (tr<0.3), then an attitude change is considered to become 
operational: it is made visible by the emergence of corruption. 
Knowledge: the cognitive or knowledge component of the attitude structure is described by 
means of a learning process. 
Learning and Adaptivity: Agents could reject corruption as a dishonest alternative of social 
relationship or they could become corrupt themselves. The temptation of corrupt acts and 
behaviors is acquired as the agents undergo processes of iterative transformation in their social 
environment. Their transformation concerns the dynamics of the basic process of trust in social 
values: trust decreases as the agents encounter difficulties in accessing the common resources. 
Variations of trust which are bellow a trust threshold enable the attitude change. Corruption is 
therefore an emergent feature of the agents which experience an attitude change with respect to 
their need to access common resources (i.e., basic survival means). Learning process of new 
competences are usually described as reaching maximum values in an asymptotic manner 
(Nembhard, 2000; Zoerthout et al., 2004; 2006). Learning develops as an iterative procees: at each 
iteration the agents acquire new knowledge concerning the access rights to the common 
resources. As the access rights to the common resources turn into privilleges of access, the 
knowledge about old access rights reach a maximum level; this processes signal a decrease of the 
agent capacity to cope with the new normative rules concerning the access to common resources; 
at this point the agents start acquiring a new normative rule of acccess and, therefore, starts 
becoming a corrupt agent. 
 
max
max
1
k
kk
kk ttt

 
    (6) 
 
where: 1tk is the current knowledge, t is the current moment of time is the learning 
speed ( = 0.2 in our experiments) and maxk is the maximum level of knowledge with regard to the 
access rights to a common resource. 
The case studies are concerned with several corruption scenarios in which the agents 
learn new patterns of social normative rules:  
 new patterns of protection-safety (privillege scape),  
 new patterns of wealth transfer and re-distribution (bribery-scape), 
 new patterns of social organization (hierachical/egalitarian) see (barron-scape) 
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6. The Simulation Model 
6.1. The Agents’ Types and Properties  
The individual agents have  a set of common attributes, like responsability and honesty, 
memory and private resources; they move in social space, interacting with each other, thus 
consuming both private and common resourcess, and consequently updating the values of their 
individual attributes as the context varies. The goal which this description serves is that of denoting 
the dynamics of two kinds of processes: the agent internal and inter-relational processes. Any 
agent is involved in special relationships with the other agents in the society. Each individual agent 
develops a specific degree of cognitive dissonance. The processes describing these relationships 
are self-organizing processes, feeding on each other in a simple but efficient connectivity pattern.  
 
6.2. The Simulation Experiments and SetUp  
The simulation model uses NetLogo 5.0.1. software6: it provides the means to create and 
evolve an artificial society with agents that move in a landscape with fix common resources.  
The artificial society represents the means to construct a typical human society in which 
the agents are characterized by dynamic processes at two levels: micro and macro. The micro 
level processes are internal to each individual agent. The macro level processes concern the 
interconnectivity of the agents and the interdependence of the inter-agent processes. The micro—
macro processes emerge from the global development of the processes described above. 
Corruption emergence and growth are studied at the micro-macro level. 
The system allows the description of global variables either internally (by code 
programming in NetLogo) or by active forms and buttons, like, for instance, the sliders used to 
describe variable private resources or the amount of information a certain agent can either hide or 
reveal. The system is initialized with random values either at the NetLogo active forms level 
(manually) or directly in the programming code of the active procedures (auto-initialization). The 
system can loop for ever in the main loop or it can be stopped, re-initialized with different random 
values and run again. One run is called a “trial”: at each trial a number of global variables are 
plotted in separate windows, like, for example: number of privilleges on the privillege-market 
(corrupt transactions), the global (social) level of networking, or the level of common resources, 
personal wealth, level of discretion (hidden information). 
The micro level self-organizing processes honesty, fairness, responsability, cognitive 
dissonance and trust. They are recursively feeding each other at each iteration: 
Honesty (Ho) is manipulated as a special variable: it is initialized with random values in the 
closed interval [0,1], where “0” value describes dishonesty and “1” value describe highest level of 
individual honesty. Honesty is not a fixed valued-variable: it is updated by a self-organizing process 
of honesty variation (h(t), where t is time). Its dynamics is described recursively: if the current 
values are going bellow a certain “honesty-threshold”, then the process of honesty undergoes a 
bifurcation and starts feeding negatively on the processes of fairness, f(t), and responsibility, r(t). 
                                                          
6 Wilensky, U.1999. netLogo. http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/. Center for Connected Learning and Computer-
Based Modeling, Northwestern University. Evanston, Il. 
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Intuitively, we try to describe the variations of honesty in conditions of low personal-resources, 
when individual agents ask the access to common resources and they have to bribe in order to get 
it. Increasing necessity of bribing means a higher pressure for the individual agent to either reject 
bribery or to lower his initial level of honesty and fairness  and to accept the perspective of 
becoming corrupt himself. 
The macro level processes:  
access-request--to-resource,  
ask-for-bribe; offer-bribe; accept-bribe; denny-bribe; 
ask-for-privillege; offer-privillege; accept-privillege; denny-privillege; 
 fear-of-retaliation; retaliation;  
hide-information; show-information. 
There are several types of agents: citizens, bureaucrats, magistrats and politicians. There 
are initialy randomly distributed common resources and private-resources. The artificial society and 
the generic experiment is fully described in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.  
The types of agents in the Bribery-Scape. 
The white circles are the Citizens (c ), the grey squares are the Bureaucrats (b),the black triangles are the Magistrats 
(m), the blue stars are the Politicians (p), the red medows are the Public Resources (r), and the red arrows are the 
bribes offered, usually, by Citizen agents (c-agents) to the privilleged agents (b-, m- and p-agents). 
 
 
Each type of agent has certain characteristics, described with a set of attributes like: trust 
in social value, cognitive dissonance, (degree of) responsibility, (degree of) fairness, (degree of) 
honesty, personal-resource, and knowledge with regard to normative rules of access to common 
resources.The generic experiment is fully described in Figure 2. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Page 46 
 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
Petar Atanasov, “Multiculturalism As A Model: Between Idea And Reality” 
EQPAM Vol.1 No.1 September 2012  
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN-L 2285 - 4916  
Camelia Florela Voinea, “Briberyscape:An Artificial Soci y-Based Simulation Model of Corruption’s Emerg nce nd Growth” 
EQPAM Vol.2 No.1 January 2013  
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN-L 2285 - 4916  
 
 
Figure 2. 
The NetLogo Interface for the Corruption Emergence Model. 
 
 
The  artificial society is depicted in the right view. At the initial setup, all active forms are 
cleared, and the agents are randomly distributed in the landscape. All types of agents have their 
initial colours: no corruption. The moving principle is similar to the basic “sugarscape” scenario 
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996): the C-agents are moving freely in the landscape using their own 
(private) resources. As these private resources are decreasing, they reach a certain threshold. At 
this point, the C-agent will try to find a public (common) resource and access it. If the public 
resource has access privilleges and if these access privilleges are provided by B-agent(s) or M-
agent(s), then the C-agent will try to bribe them. When the private resources are bellow a certain 
threshold (i.e., they are insufficient for surviving in the landscape), then the C-agent will not be able 
to offer bribe anymore, so it will try to buy access privilleges with its own freedom, so that it will be 
included in a corruption network.  
Citizens (C-agents) are pictured as white circles. Their common task is to access the 
common resources (green squares); if the resources are managed by Bureaucrat, B-agents, with 
discretionary power, the C-agents will be asked to offer bribe; the C-agents have two alternatives: 
to bribe or to refuse bribing. The C-agent uses his private resources to bribe. If the C-agent 
accepts to bribe, but the demand exceeds his private resources then the C-agent becomes a 
member in the corruption network of the corrupter agent (corruption networking phenomenon). 
Bureaucrats (B-agents), pictured as grey squares, Magistrats (M-agents), pictured as black 
triangles, and Politicians (P-agents), pictured as blue stars, are considered agents with 
discretionary powers with regard to the type of common resources they are responsible for. If their 
honesty levels are over a certain threshold, they will never ask or accept bribe. If, however, their 
individual values of honesty are bellow a certain threshold, they will ask for bribe in exchange for 
offering access privilleges to the common resources. In particular, the M-agents and P-agents 
might accept to become corrupt themselves if they fear too much of retaliation in their class of 
agents: they thus become members of corruption networks. The level of connectivity of agents in 
bribery-networks inside their class show the level of corruption of the entire artificial society. 
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As corruption emerges, the agents are changing their colour as follows: the c-agents and 
the p-agent become red, the b-agents become black, the m-agents become brown. A working 
interface is depicted in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. 
The view of the bribery-scape shows that, for the current trial,  
there are corrupt C-agents (red circles), corrupt B-agents (black squares) and corrupt M-agents (brown triangles). 
 
 
7. Case Studies and Experimental Results 
The attitude change is considered the source of corruption: it provides for the favouring 
conditions in the emergence of corruption. The favouring conditions are represented by the current 
levels of honesty (h), responsibility (r), cognitive-dissonance (cs) and trust (tr) which exceed normal 
values (i.e.: the normal values are in the interval [0,1] for all these variables, with low levels for 
normal cognitive dissonance and high levels of honesty, fairness, responsibility and trust). The 
case studies show how corruption emerges in different scenarios.  
 
7.1. Case Study no.1: The “Briberyscape”  
This case study is concerned with the emergence of petty corruption. In this scenario, the 
C-agents require access to common resources. If the common resources are in the direct 
responsibility of corrupt B-agents, the C-agents will offer bribe and, eventually, will get privilleged 
access to the resources. Usually, this kind of scenario shows that, initially, C-agents use their 
private resources as a means for surviving. At lower levels of personal resources, they will expect 
to have access to the common resources. If they ask for access and the access is conditioned by 
offering bribe, they will offer bribe using their private resources. As the private resources are 
diminishing and the access to common ressources is constantly denied by the more powerful 
agents, the cognitive dissonance of the C-agents starts to increase and the responsibility as well, 
their fairness will decrease, even if they had initially high levels of honesty. As a general 
consequence, their trust in the social values will start decreasing and therefore allow for an attitude 
change: in order to get the access to survival resources and satisfy the minimum level of 
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responsibility (with respect to the kin ties), they will try to bribe. This is the point where corruption 
emerges.The red circles are corrupt C-agents and the black squares are corrupt B-agents (see 
Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. 
The emergence of petty corruption: red circles and black squares are corrupt agents. 
 
 
7.2. Case Study no.2: The “Privil legescape”  
This case study is concerned with the emergence of grand corruption and it has been 
suggested by the work of Danileţ (Danileţ, 2009). In this scenario, the M-agents have discretionary 
power with regard to common resources of the legal type. These type of common resources 
represent justice resources (i.e.: legal liberty or legal punsihment). They could accept to offer 
privilleges (legal liberty) in exchange of bribe or they can reject bribe and apply legal punishments 
to eventual bribers. They could also accept to hide information with regard to common resources 
and therefore become corrupt either because their cogntive dissonance increases or because they 
fear of retaliation from the part of their mates. In either cases, as they accept bribe or accept to 
hide information, the M-agents become corrupt. 
In this scenario, the M-agents are studied with reference to themselves in the situations in 
which either the C-agents or the M-agents themselves might require to be absolved of legal 
punishment in exchange of bribe. We have studied the emergence of networking between corrupt 
M-agents. In such networks of corruption, C-agents might be included if they ask for any of the 
privilleges available in the magistrats class. 
We have also studied the opposition between democratic accountability vs. corrupt 
accountability. In this case, the “retaliation-scape” case study shows the distribution of M-agents 
which become corrupt from fear of retaliation from the part of their mates. 
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Figure  5. 
The emergence of grand corruption. 
 
The “grand” corrupt agents, like the magistrats, become members of corrupt networks. The 
networks start growing as new M-agents are becoming corrupt. The areas of brown color in Figure 
5 represent networks of corrupt magistrats.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure  6. 
The emergence of corruption (a) is dependent on the initial conditions, (b) it is path dependent. 
 
 
Figure 6 includes a number of plots for the global variables of the artificial society. In the 
upper plots (a) the privillege market (red trace) shows that the number of acquired privilleges is 
increasing while the number of corrupt agents is also increasing (in particular, in this plot, the 
number of corrupt citizens, corr-C, and corrupt bureaucrats, corr-B, are increasing proportionally 
with their population size in the landscape). In the same time, the cognitive dissonance increases 
dramatically (green trace) while the honesty level is at lowest level. As the dynamics of honesty, 
responsibility and trust are dependent on the initial conditions, the plots in the (b) graphical 
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windows actually show how corruption emerges and evolve on different levels. For a comparison, 
the privillege market is higher in the (b) row of plots with respect to the (a) row of plots. This is 
associated with higher levels of cognitive dissonance in the (b) plots with respect to the (a) plots. 
In both rows of plots, there is evidence that the processes at the macro level reach a kind 
of equilibrium state, in which the privillege market, for example, does not grow any more. This kind 
of phenomenon, for the privillege market in particular, is associated with the emergence and 
growth of the networking phenomenon: intuitively, when C-agents do not have anymore private 
resources to bribe for privilleges, they will start becoming members of the corrupt networks, and 
thus conceeding to serve as corrupt members in exchange for the requested privilleges. 
 
7.3. Case Study no.3: The “Baronscape”  
This case study is concerned with the emergence of the corrupt elites and their distribution 
in the landscape. The case has been suggested by the research analysis of the local corrupt elites 
in Romania, which are called  “barons” in their local communities (Precupeţu, 2008). 
In Romania, the corruption phenomena regarding the emergence of corrupt elites in some 
communities is called “baroniade”, meaning a process of concentrating the discretionary powers, 
the resources and the networks’ decision making nodes in the hands of the agents which 
accumulate high levels of personal wealth.   
 
 
  
 
  
 
Figure  6. 
The emergence of corrupt elites in local communities. 
 
The pictures in Figure 6 describe groups of corrupt agents which accumulate wealth and 
power, thus becoming powerful in their small communities. They aggregate as groups or networks 
of corrupt agents: red for corrupt citizens and black for corrupt bureaucrats. 
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8. Conclusions and Future Research  
8.1. Relevance of current approach  
Current research has achieved a global view over an artificial society in which corruption 
emerges in certain initial conditions (a certain number of agents, of common resources, of private 
resources and of certain values of the variables: trust, responsibility, honesty, fairness, and 
cognitive dissonance). The corruption level and its dynamics in the society proves to be path-
dependent. Under certain assumptions, like those mentioned above, the artificial society used by 
the Corruption Emergence Model proves that the origins of corruption and its generating 
mechanism lies in the attitude change. The attitude change has been for the first time simulated as 
an emergent feature of a set of self-organizing processes characterizing the agents.  
 
8.2. Limits of the present approach and issues of further research and development  
The approach faces the problem of a two type complexity. First, there are a number of 
social normative systems which eventually emerge in the artificial society as an effect of a long-run 
social change (like, for instance, a transition process from a political regime to another). Second, 
there is a level of cognitive dissonance which cumulates the individual values to a certain 
threshold, over which an attitude change starts to become effective in the society, making therefore 
possible the competition between the different normative systems with which the individual agents 
comply. Both the first and the second type of complexity (norm emergence and attitude change) 
represent initial conditions for corruption to emerge and evolve, either by growing or by decaying. 
However, they both should be kept in a reasonable scale and effective simulation framework in 
order to make possible the descriptive and the predictive power of the artificial society. 
Norms emergence is a huge simulation issue in the literature on agent-based systems 
(see Axelrod, 1986; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1992; Savarimuthu et al., 2009). However, there is 
no approach so far on the norm emergence with concern to corruption sources and effects. Attitude 
change is another difficult issue: in our approach it is mainly concerned with learning and adaptivity 
of the artificial society, but it has to be approached at the level of social norm learning. Current 
researches have been developed during the past three years. The software support has been 
currently changed to the SWARM software and future work will be developed on this platform.  
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